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**GAMMA Item**

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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DIA review completed.

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DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN-	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT-	Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN-	Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
ORCON-	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
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DDI #07132-84  
21 December 1984

NOTE TO: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM : Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Soviet Military Power

1. DIA's response to the review of Soviet Military Power is classically bureaucratic. We know that all the legal and declassification guidelines were followed. We also know that the

[redacted] But awareness of US intelligence capabilities in the abstract or even detailed knowledge by intelligence organizations is different than flaunting that information in a systematic way before the world and the Soviet leadership. What would happen in the US if the Soviets put out an official paper summarizing their intelligence of the US. We would go bonkers. The Executive Branch would take immediate action and Congress would launch a series of investigations. We would be outraged. But, Defense and intelligence organizations wouldn't be surprised and we probably could show how all of the information was available in open sources. [redacted]

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2. The DIA argument for publishing is that most of the information in the unclassified publication has already been made public in one form or another. It also gives a point by point rebuttal of the damage. But we do our work by taking bits and pieces of information and weaving them together. Soviet intelligence obviously uses the same approach; they just have more material. We should not help them by providing a systematic review of what we know, a review that in format and periodicity allows them to identify changes in our knowledge over time.

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Finally, we can't publicly release a comprehensive set of information giving many of our key judgments and also pursue through the courts those who compromise tidbits of classified information.

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Richard J. Kerr

**Attachment:**  
Soviet Military Power

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DDI #07132-84

SUBJECT: Soviet Military Power

ADDI/RJKerr/de [redacted]

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## DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENC.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

30 NOV 1984

S-330/VP-SB

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, CIA

SUBJECT: DIA Response to the Evaluation of DoD Publication Soviet Military Power

1. (U) DIA shares your concern that the cumulative effect of producing sequential editions of Soviet Military Power could be the revelation of sensitive sources and methods, possibly resulting in a loss of raw intelligence data. I fully support your effort and welcome the opportunity to review the draft of your study. Both general and specific comments are attached.

2. (C) I would like to summarize the procedures used in developing Soviet Military Power. From the beginning of the development phase to the release of the final product, the document is classified Secret. During the drafting, once an outline has been agreed upon, a team of analysts is given responsibility to write on the various sections and subsections. They are instructed to review and use Soviet and East European open source literature. Where necessary they can use classified intelligence, but are not to exceed Secret data. Where classified data are used they are to be so designated. Once the analytical team completes its task, the inputs are edited into a first draft document. Approximately 200 copies of this draft are circulated throughout DoD for comment. Upon completion of the review, an editorial board composed of OSD, JCS, and DIA personnel integrates the comments and reviews and rewrites classified areas to protect sources and methods. The resultant draft is then provided to NSA, CIA, the NIOs, State, USIA and the NSC for review and comment. The interagency comments are given particular attention from the standpoint of both sources and methods and national policy implications. When the review process is completed, particular points raised by individual agencies are answered by memorandum. During any step of the review process when a major issue or objection is raised, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is informed and he moves to resolve the issue to the satisfaction of all concerned. The hand-held photography appearing in the publication is obtained from both classified and unclassified sources. Where classified photography is used, release authority is obtained from the originator. Under no circumstance is hand-held photography used if it could in any way jeopardize our collectors. For renderings and line drawings, release authority is obtained from COMIREX. I feel our procedures for the preparation of Soviet Military Power more than adequately ensure the protection of intelligence sources and methods and preclude damage to national security, while still meeting the policy objectives that underwrite the publication.

3. (C) Given the charge to produce Soviet Military Power, every effort is made to comply with Executive Order 12356 on declassification and downgrading information. As I am sure you are aware, the Secretary of Defense is

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
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empowered with the authority to release information. Every effort is made to ensure that if information is released, multiple sources are available so that attribution cannot be made to a single source. NSDD-77 directs that we make available to the public information that will create a greater understanding and support for U.S. national security objectives. That we selectively purge our files of Confidential and Secret data, that confirms what is often already in the public arena, is not done without due consideration given to potential damage to national security or to individual sources.

4. (U) Finally, we are particularly sensitive to the danger of official publications corroborating random open source reporting if that reporting touches on critical issues or appears to be based on pure speculation. In such instances, extreme care is used to assess the impact of our writings. When in doubt, the issue is either dropped or blurred.



JAMES A. WILLIAMS  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army  
Director

2 Enclosures

1. General Comments (S) 1 cy
2. Specific Comments (S) 1 cy

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GENERAL COMMENTS

1. In the preparation of Soviet Military Power DIA goes to great lengths to exploit original Soviet and East European open source literature as well as Western writings on the subject.
2. The current damage assessment draft is inconclusive in its findings. The study has not demonstrated a cause-effect relationship. Neither a significant increase in Soviet denial activities since 1981 nor a loss of sources is evident. To show damage, a clear relationship must be established.
3. Soviet Military Power is a DoD publication primarily expressing DoD viewpoints. An attempt to relate the information to National Intelligence Estimates clearly is not a function of an evaluation of damage to sensitive sources and methods. The information contained in Soviet Military Power will not always agree exactly with NIE data even though coordination within the intelligence community is effected. By design some of the data in Soviet Military Power have been blurred to protect sensitive sources and methods. Additionally, the current draft study frequently makes note of findings that are unclear, inconsistent or ambiguous with respect to national intelligence. While true, it is hardly the type of material that would reveal sensitive sources and methods; rather it would tend to confuse and frustrate any effort to determine sources and methods.
4. Perhaps one of the questionable assumptions of the study is that the Soviets accept the information presented in Soviet Military Power as an accurate representation of the quality of the U.S. intelligence effort.

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